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Abstract 
 
Since the early 1990s, substantial resources and efforts have been spent on 
implementing market-oriented electricity reforms in developing countries. 
While there are important sectoral, economic, and social dimensions 
involved in electricity reform, empirical analysis and evaluation of reforms 
have been of limited use for testing the economic rationale of reforms and 
policy advice. This may partly be attributed to a lack of generally accepted 
and measured indicators for monitoring the progress, impacts, and 
performance of reforms and unlike in areas such as health, education, 
environment, and sustainable development. In this paper we propose a set of 
indicators as a first step towards filling this gap and developing a coherent 
framework for studying electricity reform in developing countries covering 
resource and institutional endowments, key reform steps, market structure, 
performance, and various impacts. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to propose a framework and a set of core indicators for 
analysing electricity sector reform in developing countries. A review of the literature 
(Jamasb et al. 2004) concludes that rigorous empirical and policy-relevant evidence on 
the performance and determinants of electricity reform in these countries is rather 
limited. The evidence that is available is derived from different models, varying 
indicator and variable definitions, and exclusive data sets making solidifying and 
extension of these empirical studies difficult. In addition, the robustness of some of the 
empirical evidence is unclear requiring further careful data analysis, model specification 
and sensitivity analysis (see e.g. Mukherjee et al., 1998; Leamer 1983; 1985). 
 
The proper study of economic reform requires an analysis of its impact and an 
assessment of the role of those factors that were influential in determining its outcome. 
Any such analysis generally involves measuring (and thereby quantifying) specific 
aspects of cause and effect. Almost invariably, this involves using both quantitative and 
qualitative indicators. 
 
Infrastructure industry liberalisation is a key part of the economic reform agenda. 
Electricity reform affects industry structure, governance and ownership and has a 
significant impact on its economic, social and environmental dimensions. It is, 
therefore, important to assess the impact of reform and its determining factors. 
However, although there have been attempts in recent years to develop indicators in 
sustainable development, agriculture, environment and health, notably by international 
organisations, far less attention has been paid to the development of appropriate 
indicators for infrastructure industries reform in general and electricity sector in 
particular (see e.g. UN, 2001; Bossel, 1999; OCED, 2002; IAEA-IEA, 2002; von 
Schrinding, 2002; Atkinson et al., 2002). 
 
Indicators reflect or represent the state of a phenomenon in the form of information. At 
the same time, indicators do not exist in isolation. Rather, they are often part of  larger 
systems within which they assume their meaning. This system or framework may be 
presented in the form of more or less formal models. The following definition of an 
indicator in OECD (1993) is relevant here: “A parameter, or a value derived from 
parameters, which points to/provides information about/describes the state of a 
phenomenon/environment/area with a significance extending beyond that directly 
associated with a parameter value”. 
 
Indicators, as simple measures or parts of a formal model, help in understanding 
complex issues and systems that otherwise could be constrained by bounded rationality. 
Although indicators have an important role in forming our understanding, simplification 
inevitably involves a degree of abstraction and loss of information. In formal models 
where the indicators become variables and interact with other variables to help 
determine the outcomes, this issue is of great importance. It is only recently that the 
indicators themselves have become the subject of inquiry. 
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The few studies that have attempted to develop indicators for electricity reform have 
tended to focus on developed countries. For example, DTI (2000) defines a set of 
indicators of electricity and gas liberalisation for European countries, and CAEM 
(2002) develops an index for retail competition in the US electricity sector. A notable 
exception is Bacon (1999) who defines and surveys some key steps in electricity reform 
for a large number of developing countries. 
 
There are some key differences between developed and developing countries that have 
to be taken into account, namely: 
 
i. The expected direction of price changes in developed and developing countries 
are often different. In many developing countries, residential customers are 
subsidised by industrial users while the reverse holds in some developed 
countries. Consequently, the expected direction of price changes from reform 
depends on the starting point. 
ii. Developed market economies (DMEs) and transition economies have near-
complete electrification but in many developing countries large rural and some 
urban groups are not connected to the electricity supply. 
iii. In many developing countries, technical and non-technical energy losses in the 
transmission and distribution networks are high compared to DMEs. 
iv. In many developing countries, the high level of non-payment has an adverse 
effect on the financial health of the sector. 
v. In many developing countries, capacity shortages, poor utilisation of existing 
capacity and unserved demand result in significant economic loss. 
vi. In developing countries, regulatory credibility, institutional weaknesses and 
political interference are more important drivers of private investment in the 
sector than in developed countries. 
 
This paper develops a framework and a set of core indicators for electricity sector 
reform in less developed countries (LDCs) that can help facilitate reform representation 
and comparison. A common reference framework also increases comparability of 
analysis and knowledge. Section 2 discusses the desirable properties of indicators, 
Section 3 explains the criteria for indicators, Section 4 is a conceptual discussion of the 
framework and typology of indicators, Section 5 presents the core indicators for 
electricity sector reforms and Section 6 contains the conclusion and possible directions 
for future work. 
 
 
2. Properties of indicators 
 
Electricity sector reform involves various sectoral, economic, social and environmental 
dimensions. In order to capture and represent the many dimension of reform, a variety 
of indicators must be identified, defined and then measured within the proper context. 
This section briefly discusses the main properties of these indicators and some related 
issues. 
 
 
Measurement unit 
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Different aspects of electricity reform need different units of measurement. Most 
technical aspects are based on generally accepted conventions and are relatively easy to 
measure, but difficulties can arise in defining system parts and system levels. For 
example, voltage cut-off points between and in transmission and distribution networks 
vary across countries. 
 
All economic and financial indicators, e. g. costs, prices, investment, are measured in 
some form of monetary unit. Availability and quality of such data can be low in many 
developing countries, and the sectoral restructuring that results in the dissolution of old 
entities and appearance of new ones makes much of the historical data incompatible or 
redundant. In addition, differences in accounting standards and inflation, as well as 
conversions using exchange rates and purchasing power parities, tend to reduce the 
usefulness of time-series and cross-country data. 
 
Some aspects of electricity reforms are, however, not readily quantifiable in physical or 
monetary units. Some common reform steps, such as introducing wholesale generation 
markets or establishing independent regulatory agencies, fall into this category. The 
main issue is that simple observation of the fact that such steps been have taken does 
not reflect their characteristics and extent. In addition, objective comparisons across 
countries are inherently difficult. Qualitative aspects of the steps are, however, often the 
crucial factor in determining the success or failure of reform, but representation of 
qualitative indicators tends to involve a degree of subjective evaluation and judgement. 
 
Subjective evaluations of complex phenomena can result in misrepresentation. The 
main electricity reform measures, such as privatisation, unbundling of functions, 
wholesale markets and independent regulation, are generally established gradually and 
have a qualitative dimension. Accounting for these measures with the use of dummy 
variables, as is sometimes done, does not reflect extent or intensity. For example, 
privatisation may be better represented by the percentage of energy generated or 
delivered by privatised firms. Also, the degree of competitiveness in wholesale 
electricity markets varies with the type and design of these markets. A practical 
approach has been to construct indicators that reflect the different states that an 
indicator can assume and then to rank them using an intensity measure. Different 
wholesale generation markets, such as a single-buyer with long-term contracts, 
voluntary spot markets, and compulsory markets with demand participation, may be 
ranked according to their perceived degree of competitiveness using an index that 
ranges from one to four. Such an approach is a reasonable representation of the market 
characteristic the variable is intended to measure. But, to increase confidence in the 
findings, sensitivity analysis involving subjective measurement of variables may still be 
needed in quantitative analysis. 
 
To reduce the number of dimensions of the phenomena being studied, it is possible to 
merge several partial indicators to create fewer, more general ones. For example, a 
reform index may be constructed by assigning values to commonly implemented steps 
such as restructuring, competition, privatisation and regulation steps, and then 
combining these into a composite indicator. A notable example of such a composite 
indicator is found in Bacon (1999): countries are assigned one score for each of the 
main reform steps and their sum is used as a measure of the extent of reform. The 
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EBRD’s Transition Reports have taken this to an even more advanced level with a 
variety of performance measures  (legal, institutional, regulatory, etc) (see EBRD, 
2001). 
 
Indicators as proxies 
Reform indicators can assume different roles depending on the particular setting or type 
of analysis in which they are used. For example, the extent of reform expressed as an 
index may be the result of the quality of economic management or a country’s 
institutional endowment; the same indicator could also be used as the determinant of a 
performance measure or indicator. 
 
In addition, indicators are often used as proxies for aspects of reforms that are not 
directly observable and can be interpreted in a variety of different ways, e. g. levels of 
electricity demand or generating capacity generally represent the size of the sector, but 
total installed generating capacity (publicly and privately-owned) has been used as 
proxy for private investments in reformed sectors (Bergara and Spiller, 1997). Also, 
where there are extensive electrification programs, consumption may be interpreted as 
proxy for access to service. Indeed, industrial consumption has been used as a proxy for 
political influence (see Zelner and Henisz, 2000). Ultimately, appropriateness and 
accuracy of findings based on proxy indicators depend on the extent to which the 
indicators represent reality. 
 
Stock vs. flow indicators 
Electricity sectors are dynamic systems that respond to factors such as demand growth, 
availability of new technologies, compliance with environmental regulations and policy 
change; reforms reshape the sector by introducing new processes and new dynamism. 
 
Within this context, reform indicators may be classified as stock or flow.  For example, 
the efficient level of installed generation capacity, transmission and distribution 
networks can only be achieved and maintained through investment and maintenance 
expenditure (flow) and new capacity (stock). Some reform measures take time to take 
full effect, e. g. regulatory commitment and credibility can be thought of as stocks built 
up over time. 
 
A related and but different type of indicator are those that reflect the rate of change in a 
measure. Some activities in the electricity sector such as generation capacity and 
number of customers tend to increase over time. The objective of reforms is often to 
accelerate the rate of change in these variables. Such changes are generally best 
measured by rate of change indicators. However, despite their potential use, such 
indicators have not yet been used in electricity reform studies. 
 
 
3. Criteria for selection of indicators 
 
Measurability 
For an indicator to be useful it needs to be based on a clear definition and to be 
measurable. This is equally important whether it is expressed in physical, monetary or 
qualitative terms. But even when the relevant aspect of reform is defined, the properties 
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of some issues make them inherently difficult to measure, e. g. the degree of a 
regulator’s independence.  Proxy indicators such as regulator’s budgetary independence 
or the number of issues over which he or she has full discretion may be used to 
represent these aspects. 
 
Comparability and consistency 
Some indicators refer to an absolute or relative benchmark, e. g. privatisation may be 
expressed as a percentage of total assets. When measured over a period of time, the 
same indicator reveals information about the progress of the program. For this reason, 
comparability of the indicator measured over time is an important criterion; an indicator 
should be consistent in definition, measurement method and data assembly. 
 
A similar argument applies to cross-sectoral comparisons, but here other issues such as 
technical standards and institutional characteristics, are also important. Comparison of 
monetary indicators can also be difficult because of differences in accounting rules and 
economic conditions such as inflation. In addition, the problems of conversion into a 
single monetary unit (e.g. Year 2000 US dollars) using currency exchange rates (or 
purchasing power parity rates) and suitable price deflators are non-trivial and familiar. 
 
Data and aggregation level 
Data should be available at realistic and reasonable levels of cost and effort, and sources 
should be reliable and, ideally, cross-checked. Care should be taken to ensure that 
consistency and continuity of data is maintained.  
 
The appropriate level of disaggregation will depend on the question being asked. For 
example, investment or energy loss data concerning different segments are useful for 
different purposes. In addition, data on price, consumption and income levels for 
different customer groups are often necessary to investigate the distributional effect of 
reforms. Firm-level analysis can shed light on aspects of electricity reform. In the 
absence of comprehensive or specific type of data for the whole sector, firm-level 
analysis can prove useful. For example, Delfino and Casarin (2001) examine the welfare 
impacts of the privatisation program in Gran Buenos Aires area in Argentina using a 
family expenditure survey of about 5,000 households. Also, firm-level data are far more 
suitable for comparative efficiency analysis of identifiable units such as distribution 
utilities within or across countries.1 
 
Essentiality and complementarity 
Collection and analysis of the range of data needed for a thorough study of electricity 
reform requires an efficient allocation of limited data. Therefore individual core 
indicators should reflect useful information that is essential to the evaluation of some 
important aspect of reform. When identifying and defining the core indicators, it is 
important to view them as part of a wider system with various inter-relationships and 
feedback loops. While an individual indicator provides insight into some essential 
aspect of reform, the core indicators should collectively represent the reform system, 
plus the broader framework within which it resides and operates. 
                                                          
1
 See e.g. Jamasb et al. (2003) for a review of the use of efficiency studies of electricity utilities in 
developing countries. 
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4. Reform model and typology of indicators  
 
Framework for analysis of electricity sector reforms 
Electricity sector reforms are multi-faceted activities with interacting factors and a 
variety of impacts. The process generally involves a set of concrete steps or measures 
based on a specific model of reform. At one level, these measures involve structural and 
organisational changes to the industry, and at another level there is a requirement for 
appropriate institutional arrangements such as legislation and new agencies. 
 
In addition, sector endowments and characteristics such as size, resource mix, historical 
development, define the initial market structure and starting point and can influence the 
reform path and outcome. Market structure is then influenced by various measures, such 
as unbundling of vertically integrated enterprises, as well as institutional factors such as 
regulatory authorities and legislation. 
 
The multi-faceted nature of reform results in a variety of outcomes so effectiveness and 
impact can be measured through different performance indicators, e. g. operating 
efficiency or increased investment. There can also be linkages between sectoral 
performance and the driving forces that trigger reform. These forces can be internal (e.g. 
poor sector performance) or external (e.g. foreign debt). Figure 1 illustrates the main 
aspects of reforms and their inter-relationships. 
 
 
Sector
endowment
(e.g. resource mix)
Structure
(e.g. market
concentration)
Reform measures
(e.g. privatisation)
Institutions
(e.g. regulation)
Performance
(e.g. private
investment)
M otivation for reform
(e.g. private capital)
Country/macro-level equivalents of the sector-level components
Environmental
impact
Economic
impact
Social
impact
 
 
Figure 1: A model of electricity sector reforms 
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It is noteworthy that each of the components of this sector-level reform model can be 
thought of as having a counterpart in a higher or country-level model of an economy. 
This model is broadly along the lines of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm of 
industrial organisation. The remainder of this section outlines these aspects of reform in 
some detail and is heavily based on Jamasb et al. (2004). 
 
Motivation for reform 
Actual reform steps, their sequence, and ultimately the reform performance, may be 
influenced by the motives (e.g. privatisation proceeds) behind the decision to reform. 
High electricity price levels may be an important driving force. Joskow (1998) points 
out that, in the US, states with the highest electricity prices were most likely to 
implement reform. The main differences in reform issues, in both developing and 
developed countries, are often rooted in the determinants and driving forces behind 
reform. 
 
In developing countries, the macroeconomic crisis of the 1980s created the need for a 
regime of fiscal responsibility. A combination of high levels of inflation, increasing 
debt burden and deterioration of the quality of public services, spurred political support 
for the liberalisation of infrastructure industries. Tariffs kept artificially low for anti-
inflationary purposes meant that electricity utilities’ self-financing capacity was 
increasingly eroded during the 1980s, affecting both investment and quality of service. 
Privatisation would improve not only the financial health of the sector, but would also 
increase revenue for state treasuries, so helping to reduce and restructuring public debt. 
In addition, new investment would be undertaken by the private sector.  
 
The need to ensure expansion of capacity is of special importance to less developed 
countries where there are 1.7 billion people without access to electricity (WRI, 2002), 
and social and environmental considerations need to be integrated into reform design. 
The pressure for reform from donor agencies also reinforced the move towards 
liberalisation. 
 
Key reform measures 
The electricity industry is a network comprising separate but connected and closely co-
ordinated, potentially competitive and natural monopoly activities. Also, historical 
development, institutional features and the resource characteristics of power sectors can 
differ considerably across countries. Although there is a substantial variability in 
individual reforms, they generally involve a combination of the following key elements 
(see e.g. IADB, 2001; Joskow, 1998; Newbery, 2002): 
 
i. Corporatisation of state-owned utilities; 
ii. Enactment of an electricity reform law; 
iii. Regulatory reform, including adoption of incentive regulation for the natural 
monopoly network activities; 
iv. Establishment of an independent regulator;  
v. Unbundling of vertically-integrated utilities into generation, transmission, 
distribution and supply activities, and where necessary horizontal splitting; 
vi. Provision of third party access to networks; 
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vii. Establishment of a competitive wholesale generation market; 
viii. Liberalisation of the retail supply market; 
ix. Privatisation of electricity assets; 
x. Definition of rules concerning consumer protection, allocation of energy 
subsidies, and stranded costs. 
 
A World Bank survey on the state of energy reform in developing countries focused on 
six key steps: (i) corporatisation or commercialisation of the core utility; (ii) enactment 
of an ‘Energy Law’; (iii) establishment of an independent regulatory authority; (iv) 
restructuring of the core utility; (v) private investment in greenfield sites; and (vi) 
privatisation (Bacon, 1999). The survey suggests a logical sequence of reform steps in 
which the most common (because logically the first) step is corporatisation and 
commercialisation of the publicly owned utility, and the least common (or logically 
final) step is privatisation. It should be noted that not all the above reform elements will 
be appropriate in all countries. For example, a particular issue that arises is whether 
smaller systems require vertical separation and third-party-access. 
 
Market structure 
In our conceptual model of reform, the market structure component refers to the wider 
framework within which the interaction of supply and demand for electricity takes 
place. Market structure at the time of reform is the result of the historical development 
of the sector, resource endowment and past policies. The initial structure of the sector 
defines the starting point for reform and is, therefore, regarded as a given factor. Some 
of the main features of market structure are the composition of demand for electricity, 
degree of vertical integration, market concentration, production technologies and degree 
of market opening. 
 
In the course of the reform process, the initial market structure is subject to changes 
induced by the various reform measures and institutions within the sector. Sectoral 
structure has a direct impact on the behaviour of market actors and consequently on 
performance. Changes in the structure can take time to implement and are often opposed 
by vested interests. It is, therefore, important that the appropriate design is envisaged 
from the start. At the same time, shortcomings in the structure may increase the need for 
intervention and rules that tend to be imperfect substitutes and increase uncertainty. 
 
Institutional factors 
Institutional factors refer to the sector-level legal and regulatory frameworks that 
influence and support continuity of reform. An electricity act or law is generally 
recognised as a prerequisite for implementation, and most market-oriented reforms 
involve establishing independent regulatory agencies for overseeing the functioning of 
the sector and for protecting the rights of consumers. 
 
Effective regulatory practice requires clarity of the regulator’s mandate and clarity of 
the rules defining their relationship with other bodies, such as the competition 
commission (or anti-monopoly agency) and relevant ministries. The degree of 
independence and the powers of the regulators to perform their tasks are often 
interpreted as an indicator for political commitment to the reform process on the part of 
the decision-makers. 
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Sector endowments 
Specific reform measures and some aspects of market structure and the institutional 
framework may be chosen as variables. However these choices, and ultimately the 
sector performance, are also influenced by the sector’s endowments. Factors such as the 
size of the system, generation technologies (particularly hydroelectric resources), 
availability of domestic fuel, interconnections and geography can influence and 
constrain options and choices. 
 
Sector performance 
Reform performance can be evaluated along several dimensions. Private ownership, 
competition, and regulatory reform should improve technical performance by improving 
capacity utilisation, operating efficiency, labour productivity and energy losses. A key 
motivation for reform in developing countries is to attract private capital to reduce the 
burden on the general budget and to accelerate the pace of investment in new capacity. 
Domestic and international private investment, as well as public investment, will 
indicate the extent to which this is achieved and also indicate the significance of private 
sector participation. 
 
Price changes are likely to be the most important factor for consumers, though in some 
countries service reliability may be even more important. Price changes measure the 
extent to which productivity gains have been transferred to consumers. Real price 
increases may not be undesirable if they had been too low and had required a subsidy. 
Successful reforms should improve revenue collection. The costs of an unreliable 
service are generally rather high so improvement in the quality of service is an 
important performance indicator. 
 
External reform impacts 
The electricity sector is capital intensive, crucial for economic activity and consumer 
welfare, and gives rise to significant environmental concerns. Changes in the structure, 
operation and performance may, therefore, have wide impacts, both on the environment 
and on the budget. The main economic impacts of reform are associated with 
investment. In many developing countries, demand for electricity is growing rapidly and 
the required investment puts a strain on public budgets. Also, the dead-weight loss 
associated with public funding can be relatively high (Beato and Laffont, 2002) 
compared to cost-recovering tariffs that allow debt financing. Private investment can 
reduce the pressure on public finance and release budgetary funds for other, more 
pressing, social and economic needs. 
 
The social impact of electricity reform can be measured by welfare change resulting 
from price and consumption change, allowing for the public sector budgetary impact 
(the marginal cost of raising taxes or reducing public expenditure elsewhere). One 
major social benefit in poorer countries may be the extension of electrification to 
currently unserved groups. In addition, reforms have environmental impacts through 
changes in generation mix and energy use patterns. The effect of reform on fuel and 
technology choices can result in significant changes in emissions of greenhouse gasses 
and pollutants. 
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5. Core electricity reform indicators 
 
5.1 General 
 
This section outlines a wide range of indicators that reflect key aspects of the state and 
development of electricity reform. The core indicators, highlighted in bold, are deemed 
essential and represent the most important (e.g. controllable operating and maintenance 
costs rather than labour costs) or the preferred alternatives (e.g. number of customer 
minutes lost rather than the number of interruptions). 
 
Each group of indicators also includes non-core but potentially useful indicators. 
Although some non-core indicators are difficult to measure, where they are available, 
they may be useful for in-depth and detailed studies. Some indicators can be modified to 
address specific issues. The organising principle for the different categories is similar to 
that of the individual components of the general reform model described in Section 4 
and range from firm-level to high-level country factors through sector-level indicators. 
 
The main body of core indicators are sector-specific and relate to the main aspects of 
reform. They also reflect some features of energy and electricity resources. Key steps 
show the extent to which the reform has been implemented against a full-scale reference 
model. Market structure indicators focus on the main features of the environment within 
which the sector operates, governance and regulatory indicators focus on institutional 
aspects of, and rules for, the oversight of the sector, and performance indicators focus 
on important technical, financial and social dimensions of reforms. 
 
Firm-level indicators allow for the analysis of firm types or can be used when sector-
level data is inadequate. Such indicators have proven particularly useful in comparative 
efficiency analysis of companies within a country, and across several countries. Macro-
level indicators represent key aspects of country-level factors that have bearings for 
reform implementation and performance. Impact indicators reflect the effect of reform 
on the wider economic, social and environmental framework within which the sector 
operates. 
 
 
5.2 Policy relevance of core reform indicators 
 
In a review of the literature, Jamasb et al. (2004) examine the existing studies based on 
a variety of questions and hypotheses using different methods and sets of variables. The 
review also outlines an array of further relevant questions that have not yet been 
thoroughly investigated. In keeping with the essentiality criteria, core reform indicators 
should be relevant to important reform issues. This subsection presents a case for a set 
of core indicators that can help achieve this aim. 
 
It is important to note that the core reform indicators can be used in a variety of ways: as 
simple presentations of the current state of affairs, as trends over time and for 
comparisons. Clearly, there is a need for a well-defined, consistent and comparable set 
of indicators. More importantly, the indicators may also be used to answer policy and 
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research questions or test specific hypotheses. This section is primarily concerned with 
the latter in more formal and structured analytical settings. Broadly, there are three 
approaches to analysing electricity reform: (i) econometric methods, (ii) efficiency and 
productivity analysis methods, and (iii) individual or comparative case studies. 
 
Econometric studies are best suited to the analysis of well-defined issues and the testing 
of hypotheses through statistical analysis of reform determinants and performance. The 
scope of single-country time-series and cross-section analysis is limited by the number 
of observation years available, and, as the main questions are related to reform 
determinants and the significance of various steps in the process, scope for the use of 
such methods is mainly within the framework of cross-country analysis. 
 
Efficiency and productivity analyses are suitable for measuring the effectiveness with 
which inputs are transformed into outputs, relative to best practice. Efficiency analysis 
can be based on econometric techniques such as stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and 
corrected ordinary least squares (COLS), or it can use non-parametric methods based on 
linear programming and optimisation techniques, such as data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) originating from operations research. Comparative efficiency analysis is most 
suitable where the units of analysis are whole sectors or companies. These methods 
have proven useful in analysis and incentive-based regulation of electricity distribution 
utilities, primarily in developed countries. This is largely due to the fact that the basic 
technical features and structures of electricity distribution systems are rather similar, 
making direct comparison plausible and practical. 
 
Single or multi-country case studies are suitable when in-depth investigation or 
qualitative analysis is needed. This approach provides the methodological flexibility 
required for these types of investigations and is particularly useful for exploring 
processes. In addition, case studies are the obvious choice where a combination of 
different tasks, such as in cost-benefit analysis, is required. They may also lead to the 
development of hypotheses which can later be tested using more formal cross-country 
quantitative analysis. 
 
In the following, we outline a selected number of important and current reform-related 
policy issues in the form of general research questions or hypotheses. Although the 
policy questions outlined here are by no means exhaustive, they do illustrate the 
practical relevance of the core reform indicators and their use in evaluating and 
analysing some of the most pressing issues facing reforming countries and international 
development agencies. 
 
i. Higher economic and governance indicators, as well as independent 
regulation and cost-reflective pricing, lead to higher private investment. 
Private sector investment constitutes the cornerstone of market–oriented 
electricity reforms. However, the marked decline in recent years of interest 
among international investors indicate reform vulnerability in developing 
countries to macroeconomic volatility and weaknesses in political and economic 
governance and institutions (Harris, 2003). The significance of these factors has 
direct policy relevance for many reforming countries and for international 
development organisations. This type of question can best be addressed by 
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cross-country analysis using econometric methods. The main core indicators for 
the analysis with reference to the components of our reform model are 
investments (Table V), country-level factors (Table VII), sector regulation 
(Table IV), economic factors (Table VIII), and social aspects (Table IX). 
 
ii. There is a system size below which vertical separation and competition is not 
effective or not worthwhile, and a level of institutional and governance 
endowment below which private participation is not feasible. 
It is generally recognised that reform design should take the specific 
characteristics of the sector into account. However, this notion is often expressed 
in general, rather than specific terms. Two factors that characterise many 
reforming developing countries are small system size and very weak institutions. 
Countries with small systems may have inherent limitations with regards to the 
introduction of effective competition. Also, the poorest countries tend to exhibit 
the weakest levels of institutional development so are regarded by private 
investors as too risky or commanding high-risk premiums. This type of question 
may be addressed by cross-country analysis using econometric or comparative 
case studies. The main core indicators for this analysis with reference to the 
components of our reform model are market structure indicators (Table III), key 
reform steps (Table II) and various country-level indicators. 
 
iii. Diverse generation resource mix, energy independence and country 
institutional development are positively correlated with extent of reform. 
An understanding of the importance of exogenous factors as determinants of the 
type or extent of reform can help in design and lead to an understanding of what 
measures may be feasible. This, and similar questions, can be addressed through 
econometric methods. The main core indicators with reference to the 
components of our reform model are the key reform steps implemented (Table 
II), resource mix and endowments indicators (Table I), and country-level 
indicators (Table VII). 
 
iv. Incentive regulation and privatization improve cost and technical efficiency in 
electricity distribution networks. 
In general, this type of analysis is best addressed through efficiency and 
productivity analysis at company level. These techniques are used to determine 
the relative efficiency of the distribution utilities. Alternatively, efficiency 
analysis can be used as part of the regulatory reform of distribution networks and 
the implementation of yardstick regulation or post-reform monitoring and 
performance evaluation. A variety of combinations of input and output can be 
used. Monetary core indicators, such as controllable operating costs, capital 
expenditures and stock of capital, are required for cost efficiency analysis of 
firms. In addition, the main physical characteristics of the system need to be 
accounted for, namely, the length of network, transformers, units of electric 
energy delivered, system losses, maximum system simultaneous demand, and 
number and composition of the utilities’ customers (Table VI.). 
 
v. Welfare economic effects of reform vary across income groups, and ineffective 
regulation prevents the gains from reform from being passed onto customers. 
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Reform and privatization are expected to lead to tangible benefits for consumers. 
However, in many developing countries there are indications that public 
acceptance of privatization programmes has declined in recent years (Lora and 
Panizza, 2002). This may be partly the result of ineffective regulatory 
frameworks for ensuring that customers benefit from efficiency improvements 
and that vulnerable income groups are protected. This type of question can be 
addressed through case studies involving cost-benefit analysis and distributional 
impacts. The main core indicators with reference to the components of our 
reform model are price and consumption data for income groups (Table IX), 
changes in access and quality of service (Table V), regulatory framework (Table 
IV), and where possible environmental impacts of reforms (Table X). 
 
 
5.3 Electricity sectors indicators 
 
 
I. Sector endowments and characteristics 
 
Focus area Indicator 
 
Data Source 
(UK as example) 
Reference 
● Resource mix 
 
 
► Electricity generation mix:  
(i) net generation capacity (MW) 
(ii) energy supplied  (MWh) 
► Primary energy supply mix (MTOE) 
 
IEA and OECD 
 
 
 
● Energy security and 
resource independence 
► Electricity consumption, domestic 
production, import, export (MWh) 
► Energy consumption, domestic production, 
import, exports (MTOE). 
► Self-sufficiency in electricity – domestic 
production GWh / domestic production + net 
imports (%) 
► Energy self-sufficiency – domestic/total  (%) 
 
 Drillisch et al. 
(1998) 
 
 
● Reserve  generation 
capacity 
► Reserve capacity – at maximum demand 
(MW, and as % of total installed capacity) 
 
  
● Electricity and energy 
consumption per capita 
► Electricity consumption per capita 
► Energy consumption per head 
 
 Zhang et al. (2002) 
● Unserved demand ► Households without electricity (number 
and % of total)  
► Non-commercial energy (amount) 
 
  
● Energy and electricity 
intensity of GDP 
► Electricity use per GDP unit (kWh/$) 
► Energy use per GDP unit (TOE/$) 
 
 Zhang et al. (2002) 
● Overall system price-
cost relationship 
 
► Price/cost (values per kWh, ratio) 
  
  
● Number of customers ► No. of residential, industrial, and commercial 
customers. customers 
 
  
● Natural gas (domestic 
availability) 
► Proven reserves / annual production ratio 
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II. Key Reform Steps 
 
Focus area Indicator 
 
Data Source  
(e.g. UK) 
Source/reference 
(example) 
● Electricity law or act 
 
► Date of effectiveness (year) 
 
Regulator’s web-site 
 
 
Bacon (1999) 
● Corporatisation ► Are state-owned enterprises corporatised? 
(no/yes-fully, partially) 
 
Interviews Bacon (1999) 
● Privatisation ► Start date (year) 
► Privatisation proceeds from G, T, D 
(national currency and US$ per kW, MWh)* 
► Privatised electricity assets – G (MW), T 
(MW), D (MWh) as % of total 
 
 Zhang et al. (2002) 
 
Siniscalco, et al. 
(2001) 
Bacon (1999) 
● Unbundling 
 
► Vertical separation of G from T/D 
(no/yes – legal, accounting, ownership) 
 
 Bacon (1999) 
Steiner (2001) 
● Private sector 
participation (new entry) 
 
► Are new private concessions and 
greenfield investments allowed? (no/yes) 
 
 Bacon (1999) 
● Retail competition 
 
► Is retail competition allowed? (no/yes - 
Down to what level? 
 
 Bacon (1999) 
 
 
● Wholesale electricity 
market 
 
► Is a wholesale market established? (no/yes 
– Pool, single-buyer, cost-based/price-based, 
voluntary / compulsory participation, 
demand participation, contract market 
bilateral, forward), balancing, IPPs) 
 
 Zhang et al. (2002) 
Steiner (2001) 
● Regulator 
 
► Is a regulator established? (no/yes – 
independent, ministerial, other) 
 
 Zhang et al. (2002) 
Bacon (1999) 
● Network regulatory 
reform 
 
► Is there incentive regulation for T 
networks? (no/yes – price-cap, partial 
incentive schemes, other) 
► Is there incentive regulation for D 
networks? (no/yes – price-cap, partial 
incentive schemes, other) 
 
  
● Composite reform 
index 
► Number of key reform steps taken 
(alternatively weighted) 
 
 Bacon and Besant-
Jones (2002), 
Drillisch et al. 
(1998) 
 
* G: Generation, T: Transmission, D: Distribution 
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III. Market Structure 
 
Focus area Indicator 
 
Data Source (e.g. 
UK) 
Source/reference 
(example) 
● Degree of vertical 
integration 
 
► Energy delivered by vertically integrated 
firms (own generation as % of total demand) 
 
Questionnaire to 
regulator 
 
● Number of firms ► Number of G, T, D firms  
 
  
● Ownership structure 
 
► Private, local, government owned G, T, D 
firms (size - MW/MWh, number of firms) 
 
 Steiner (2001)  
● Wholesale market 
 
► Is there a wholesale generation market? 
(no/yes – type: e.g. single-buyer, cost-based 
pool, voluntary or compulsory pool 
participation, demand-side participation, 
bilateral/forward contract market, balancing 
market, IPPs 
 
 As above 
● Wholesale market 
concentration 
► Market share of 1st-5th largest generators 
(as % of total capacity). 
► HHI of generation firms (index) 
 
  
● Access to networks 
 
► Are there provisions for generators to 
have access to transmission network? (no, yes 
– rTPA, nTPA) 
 
 Steiner (2001) 
● Retail market opening ► Degree of market opening (% of total 
consumption liberalised) 
► Threshold level for retail customer choice 
(MW, MWh) 
► Retail competition (no., % share of 
independent suppliers in different market 
segments) 
► Degree of switching from incumbent 
suppliers (no. and % of eligible customers) 
 
 Steiner (2001) 
● Interconnections ► Interconnections with other systems 
 (capacity, % share of total market) 
 
  
● Independent Power 
Producers (IPPs) 
► Significance of IPPs (no., share, and type - 
long-term contract, merchant) 
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IV. Regulation, Governance, and Institutions 
 
Focus area Indicator 
 
Data Source 
(e.g. UK) 
● Establishment of 
regulator  
 
► Start date of regulator (year) Questionnaire to 
regulator and 
interview 
● Network regulation 
and price control 
 
 
► T regulation (ROR, PCAP, other) 
► D regulation (ROR, PCAP, other) 
► Length of price control period (years) 
► Are there quality of service targets? (no/yes – type) 
 
 
● Transmission network 
access and system 
operation 
► Is third-party access to T networks? (no/yes - rTPA, nTPA) 
► Is TSO independent of network operator? (no/yes) 
 
 
● Market structure 
regulation 
 
► Are there restrictions on vertical integration? (no/yes) 
► Are there restrictions on horizontal integration? (no/yes) 
 
 
● Subsidies ► Are there cross-subsidies between residential, industrial and 
service users? (no/yes - type) 
► Are there government-funded subsidies? (no/yes - type)  
 
 
● Regulatory budget and 
resources 
► Annual budget size of regulator (amount) 
► Source of regulatory funds (government, levies on companies, 
customer levies, other) 
► Total and professional staff (no.) 
 
 
● Regulator appointment 
and dismissal 
► Who appoints the regulator? (president, prime minister, 
parliament) 
► How long is the regulator’s term? (fixed term – years, unlimited_ 
► Can the regulator be re-appointed? (no/yes) 
► Which authority can dismiss the regulator (president, prime 
minister, minister, parliament) 
 
 
● Regulatory decisions 
 
► Who makes the final regulatory decisions? (a single head, board, 
other) 
 
 
● Regional regulators ► Are there regional regulators? (no/yes) 
 
 
● Consultation and 
transparency 
► Is there an open consultation process prior to decisions? 
(no/yes) 
► Are regulatory decisions open to the public? (no/yes) 
► Does the regulator publish hearings, decisions, and 
explanations? (no/yes) 
► Does the regulator have a website? (no/yes) 
► Are consultation papers on the website? (no/yes) 
 
 
● Appeal ► Can the regulator’s decisions be appealed? (no, yes – to whom) 
 
 
● Regulatory discretion 
and mandate 
► Can the regulator decide on prices? (no/yes) 
► Can the regulator decide award of G, T, and D permits/licences? 
(no/yes) 
► Is the regulator mandated to protect customers? (no/yes) 
► Does the regulator have mandate and rules concerning 
disconnection for non-payment? (no/yes) 
► Are there other formal (government, consumer groups, etc.) bodies 
in charge of customer protection? (no/yes – who)  
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V. Sector Performance 
 
Focus area Indicator 
 
Data Source (e.g. 
UK) 
Source/reference 
(example) 
● Technical and 
physical performance 
 
► Asset utilisation: system load factor 
(electricity generation MWh / average 
capacity MWx8760 as a percentage) 
► Labour productivity (net electricity 
generation per employee MWh) 
► Plant availability factor (Load factor by 
plant, i.e. electricity generation MWh / 
average capacity MWx8760 ratio) 
► T system losses - technical and non-
technical losses (MWh, %) 
► D system losses – technical and non-
technical losses (MWh, %) 
► Electricity consumption per capita (KWh) 
► Generation capacity per capita (MW) 
► Reserve margin 
 
 Regulator’s 
publications  
 
Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) 
 
Questionnaire 
Zhang (2002) 
 
Steiner (2001)  
● Sector investments 
 
► Domestic investments in G, T, D – 
greenfield projects, privatised assets 
(amounts) 
► Foreign investments in G, T, D – 
greenfield and privatised assets (amounts) 
► Government investments in G, T, D 
(amounts) 
► Foreign investments as % of total foreign 
direct investments (FDI) 
 
  
● Quality of service ► Reliability of service (number of 
interruptions) 
► Security of service (number of minutes lost 
per customer) 
 
  
● Non-payments 
 
► Non-payment and foregone revenues 
(amount, as % of total electricity delivered, as % 
of total revenues 
 
  
● System expansion 
 
► Generation capacity growth (MW, as % of 
total) 
 
  
● Prices ► End-user prices - residential, industrial, 
commercial sectors with and without taxes 
(price per KWh) 
► Ratio of industrial to residential prices 
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5.4  
 
 
VI. Firm-level indicators 
 
Focus area Indicator 
 
Data Source  
(e.g. UK) 
Source/reference 
(example) 
● Electric energy  ► Total units of energy sold (MWh) 
► Domestic/industrial/commercial sale (MWh) 
► Maximum demand (MW) 
► Service area (Sq. km) 
 
Company annual 
reports and 
regulatory accounts. 
 
Regulator’s 
publications.  
Pardina and Rossi 
(2000) 
● Customers ► Total no. of customers 
► No. residential/non-residential customers 
 
 Jamasb and Pollitt 
(2003) 
● Networks ► Total network length (km) 
► Low/medium/high-voltage (km) 
► Total transformer capacity (MVa) 
► Low/high-voltage transf. cap. (MVa) 
► Total no. of transformers 
► No. of low/high-voltage transformers 
► Total energy loss at T/D networks (MWh) 
► Technical and non-technical energy losses at 
networks (MWh, % of total energy) 
 
 Jamasb and Pollitt 
(2003) 
● Quality of service ► Security of service (no. of minutes lost) 
► Reliability of service (no. of interruptions) 
 
 Giannakis et al. 
(2003) 
● Costs and revenues ► Total costs (value) 
► Controllable O&M costs (value) 
► Labour costs (value) 
► Annual capital expenditures (value) 
► Electricity capital stocks (value) 
► Revenues from electricity sales (value) 
► Net margin (net earnings/revenue %) 
► Corporate capital employed (value) 
 
 Jamasb and Pollitt 
(2003) 
Delmas et al. (2003) 
 
● Power generation ► Generation capacity – by fuel type (MW) 
► Energy production – by fuel type (MWh) 
► Load factor (avg. load MW/ capacity MW) 
► Electricity sold to other utilities (MWh) 
► Purchased power from other utilities (MWh) 
 
Company annual 
reports 
 
Department of Trade 
and Industry 
Arocena et al. (1999) 
Hattori (1999) 
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5.5  
 
 
VII. Macro-Level Indicators 
 
Focus area Indicator 
 
Data Source (e.g. 
UK) 
Source/reference 
(example) 
● GDP 
 
► GDP per capita OECD  Bacon and Besant-
Jones (2002) 
 
● Energy intensity 
 
► Electricity use per unit of GDP  
► Energy use per unit of GDP 
 
IEA Statistics: 
World Energy 
Statistics 
See above 
● Economic 
liberalisation 
 
► Has liberalisation been implemented in 
other infrastructure industries? (no/yes – e.g. 
natural gas, telecom, transport, railway) 
 
 See above 
● Country risk 
 
► Country risk index  Bacon and Besant-
Jones (2002) 
 
● Institutional 
endowment 
► Institutional and political strength – e.g. 
Judiciary independence, economic 
management, corruption indices 
 
 Bergara et al. (1997) 
Kaufmann et al. 
(1999a, 1999b) 
● Foreign aid and 
economic dependence 
 
► Foreign aid share of GDP (ratio) 
► Degree of economic freedom (index) 
 
 Bacon and Besant-
Jones (2002) 
Zhang (2002) 
● Human capital ► literacy rate (%) 
► Post-secondary education (%) 
 e.g. World Bank 
competitiveness 
indicators 
Domah et al. (2002) 
 
 
5.6  
 
 
VIII. Economic impacts 
 
Focus area Indicator 
 
Data Source (e.g. 
UK) 
Source/reference 
(example) 
● Relative prices ► Ratio of industrial to residential prices 
 
Regulator’s 
publications 
 
Steiner (2001)  
Hattori (2003) 
● Subsidies ► Are there cross-subsidies between 
residential, industrial and service users? (no/yes) 
► Are there public subsidies? (no, yes–amount) 
 
Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) 
 
● Investments in the 
sector 
 
► Private and Government investments in G, 
T, D (amounts) 
► Government investments in G, T, D (as % 
of total public budget & investments) 
 
  
● Efficiency gains 
 
► Estimated efficiency gains (as % of GDP) 
 
 Chisari et al. (1997) 
Bacon and Besant-
Jones (2002) 
 
 
Core Indicators for Determinants and Performance of Electricity Sector Reform in Developing Countries 
 20
 
IX. Social impacts 
 
Focus area Indicator 
 
Data Source 
(e.g. UK) 
Source/reference 
(example) 
● Consumer prices ► End-user prices – Avg. residential, 
industrial, commercial prices with and 
without taxes (per KWh) 
► Price levels for different income groups (%) 
► Consumption levels for different income 
groups (MWh) 
► Expenditures on electricity for different 
income groups  
► Ratio of daily disposable income for 20% 
poorest income groups to price of electricity 
 
IEA Statistics: 
Energy Price and 
Taxes  
 
IEA Statistics: 
World Energy 
Statistics 
 
Surveys 
Delfino and Casarin 
(2001) 
 
Torero and Pascó-
Font (2003) 
 
IAEA-IEA (2002) 
● Economic welfare ► Welfare effect among income groups 
► Welfare distribution effect among 
government, consumers, producers 
 
 Ennis and Pinto 
(2002) 
Mota (2003) 
● Access to service 
 
► Level of electrification (no., % of total 
households connected) 
► Rate of change in electrification (no. of new 
connections) 
► Level of urban electrification (no., % of total 
urban households connected) 
► Level of rural electrification (no., % of total 
rural households connected) 
 
  
● Energy use ► Electricity consumption per capita (KWh) 
► Commercial energy use per capita (KWh, 
annual growth rate %) 
► Share non-commercial energy as total energy 
consumption (%) 
 
 Bacon and Besant-
Jones (2002) 
● Continuity of service 
 
► Dis-connections from service (no.)   
 
 
 
X. Environmental impacts 
 
Focus area Indicator 
 
Data Source  
(e.g. UK) 
Source/reference 
(example) 
● Climate change 
 
► CO2 emissions by the sector (0,000 tones) 
► Rate of change in CO2 emissions by the 
sector (%) 
► CO2 intensity of the sector (‘000 
tones/MWh) 
 
IEA  Statistics: CO2 
Emissions from Fuel 
Combustion  
National Statistics 
Online 
 
 
● Polluting emissions  ► SO2, NOx, particulates, CO, VOC 
emissions by the sector (quantity) 
► Rate of change in SO2, NOx, particulates, 
CO, VOC emissions by the sector (%) 
► Concentration levels of SO2, NOx, 
particulates, CO, VOC in urban areas (values) 
 
Department for 
Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs: 
Digest of 
Environmental 
Statistics 
IAEA-IEA (2002) 
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6. Summary and directions for the future 
 
This paper develops a framework and proposes a set of core indicators for electricity 
sector reform. Empirical research is currently limited, and existing evidence is rather 
fragmented and based on a variety of model specifications, variable definitions and 
types of data. Having a shared set of core indicators will contribute to research and 
policy making by facilitating verification and extension of results from other studies. 
The indicators can be used in general purpose monitoring of reform progress, as well as 
in empirical studies using econometric, efficiency and case study analysis of individual 
countries and cross-country comparisons. 
 
In the first instance, mapping the main sources of data can follow the proposed 
framework and indicators as some of these will be readily available from open sources. 
A glance at the tables in section 5.3 suggests that most of the data under sector 
endowments and characteristics (Table I), macro-level indicators (Table VII) and 
environmental impacts (Table X) is available at the country level. It also appears that 
significant amounts of data have been collected on key reform steps (Table II), market 
structure (Table III), regulation, governance and institutions (Table IV) and economic 
impacts (Table VIII). However, the data needs to be regularly updated and there does 
not seem to have been a sustained effort at the level of the World Bank and other 
international development and finance organisations to do this. 
 
The areas where most work on data collection, extension and standardisation needs to 
be done would appear to be on sector performance indicators (Table V) and firm-level 
indicators (Table VI). Data for some of the missing indicators may be collected with 
relative ease through surveys, and the proposed framework described in this paper 
facilitates the design of such surveys. For some indicators, the practicality of collecting 
the data needs to be assessed given the significant potential collection cost; some of the 
social impact indicators under Table IX, such as welfare effects among income groups,2 
may be extremely time consuming to collect on a consistent basis. 
 
As in some other areas of social and economic studies, data collection work can be 
initiated by relevant international organisations and can then be carried forward through 
co-operation with other international and national bodies. The International Energy 
Agency (IEA), the US Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration 
(EIA), the Latin American Energy Organisation (OLADE) and the African Energy 
Policy Research Network (AFREPREN) provide a good starting point for international 
energy data. Due to the dynamic nature of electricity reform it is important that data is 
collected on a consistent, ongoing basis. 
 
Not all data will be available for all countries in all years but this does not necessarily 
mean that the process cannot begin. Existence of a shared framework and co-ordinated 
effort is a first step and an incentive to join such an effort or to integrate them into the 
existing data collection programs. Costs and required resources are justified by the 
social and economic importance of the electricity sector. Electricity reforms can have a 
                                                          
2
 Although welfare impacts would seem to be extremely important we do not highlight these as core 
indicators because of the difficulty of collection. 
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significant effect on many development goals (such as contained in the Millennium 
Development Goals3) that are directly or indirectly dependent on developing sustainable 
energy systems in developing countries. 
 
We tentatively suggest the following strategy for World Bank data collection in order to 
build a comprehensive resource base on electricity sector reforms: 
 
i. Agree a list of desirable indicators and countries, 
ii. Begin a search and summarise the main published (international) data resources, 
iii. Conduct a systematic search of internal World Bank resources e.g. by collecting 
latest country mission reports on energy sector, 
iv. Make inventory of missing data and countries,  
v. Begin detailed search of national sources e.g. ministries of energy, industry, and 
regulatory agencies, 
vi. Agree on required data after looking at all published sources, 
vii. Draft questionnaire for survey of energy ministries and regulators, 
ix. Collate final results, 
x. Post data base on the Internet when finalised, 
xi. Solicit voluntary contributions and updates from authorities, organisations, and 
companies, and  
xii. Review, maintain, and update periodically. 
 
 
                                                          
3
 See http://www.developmentgoals.org/ 
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